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Forum Selection Clauses Designating
Foreign Courts: Does Federal or
State Law Govern Enforceability
in Diversity Cases? A
Question Left Open by Stewart
Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp.

I. Introduction
Disputes arising under international contracts 1 pose substantial risk of
expense and inconvenience to the contracting parties because litigation
may force either party to defend in a non-native court. This risk can be
mitigated if the parties agree at the negotiating stage to designate, in a
forum selection clause, an exclusive court 2 for litigating irreconcilable
disputes.
Certain compensation arrangements are usually incorporated into a
forum selection clause to distribute equitably the potential cost of litigation between the parties. For example, if a forum selection clause
between A and B designates courts in A's country, A usually will compensate B for potential expenses associated with litigation in a foreign
country. Or the parties may designate a court in a neutral country, in
which case the parties divide between them potential expenses of
litigation.
Parties to a forum selection clause agree not to bring suit in an
excluded court.3 If a party breaches a forum selection clause by suing in
an excluded court, the excluded court must determine as a threshold
matter the enforceability of the forum selection clause. If the clause is
enforceable, the excluded court will either dismiss the case or transfer it
1. For purposes of this Note, an international contract is a contract between a
U.S. citizen or corporation and a foreign citizen or corporation.
2. For purposes of this Note, these exclusive courts are called "contractual"
courts.

3. "Excluded" courts are all courts which have jurisdiction over the contractual
parties' dispute but in which the parties agree not to bring suit. If courts A, B, and C
have jurisdiction over the contractual parties' dispute, and if the forum selection
clause designates court A, the parties agree not to bring suit in courts B or C even
though these courts have jurisdiction. In this case, court A is the contractual court
and courts B and C are the excluded courts.
22 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 307 (1989)
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to the contractual court, but if the clause is unenforceable the excluded
court will hear the case.
For a U.S. federal diversity court 4 to determine enforceability of a
forum selection clause, it must first decide whether federal or state law
governs enforceability. 5 Prior to the U.S. Supreme Court decision in
Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp.,6 some federal courts ruled that
state law governed the issue, 7 while others ruled that federal law governed.8 Those courts applying federal law applied federal judge-made
law because no federal statute specifically governed enforceability of
forum selection clauses. 9 In deciding the choice-of-law issue, no federal
court drew a distinction between forum selection clauses designating
domestic courts and those designating foreign courts.
Under the Erie doctrine, federal courts normally resolve federalstate choice-of-law issues by applying state law to substantive issues and
federal law to procedural issues. 10 The enforceability of forum selection
clauses, however, is an issue properly characterized as substantive and
4. Federal diversity courts are federal courts exercising federal diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982).
5. For purposes of this Note, this issue is called the "choice-of-law" issue.
6. 108 S.Ct. 2239 (1988).
7. See, e.g., General Engineering Corp. v. Martin Marietta Alumina, 783 F.2d 352
(3d Cir. 1986). State law on the enforceability of forum selection clauses varies from
state to state. Some states declare that forum selection clauses are generally enforceable. E.g., ABC Mobile Sys. v. Harvey, 701 P.2d 137 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985); Havenstein & Bermeister Inc. v. Met-Fab Indus., 320 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 1982); Smith,
Valentino & Smith, Inc. v. Superior Ct., 17 Cal. 3d 491, 551 P.2d 1206 (1976). Other
states declare that forum selection clauses are automatically unenforceable. E.g.,
Zurich Insurance Co. v. Allen, 436 So.2d 1094 (Fla. 1984); Leonard v. Paxon, 654
S.W.2d 440 (Tex. 1983); State ex rel. Gooseneck Trailer v. Barker, 619 S.W.2d 928
(Mo. Ct. App. 1981); Cartridge Rental Network v. Video Entertainment, 132 Ga. Ap.
748, 209 S.E.2d 132 (1974).
8. See, e.g., Sun World Lines, Ltd. v. March Shipping Co., 801 F.2d 1066 (8th
Cir. 1986).
9. Specifically, those federal courts applied the rule articulated in The Bremen v.
Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972), which held that forum selection clauses are
prima fade enforceable.
The Bremen was an admiralty decision. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1) (1982) gives the federal
district courts exclusive, original jurisdiction over civil cases arising in admiralty.
This statute is based on the Constitution's Article III, § 2 grant of federal judicial
power over admiralty cases. Courts have interpreted this constitutional grant ofjudicial power as authorizing federal courts to fashion uniform, substantive rules of decision in admiralty cases. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917); C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, 19 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4514, at
256 (1982) [hereinafter FEDERAL PRACTICE]. Federal common law developed under
admiralty jurisdiction, however, is only applicable in other admiralty cases and does
not, of its own power, provide rules of decisions in diversity cases. Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 108 S.Ct. 2239, 2243 (1988). Federal diversity courts that
adopted the Bremen rule did so pursuant to their perceived power, derived from the
Article III grant of judicial power and the Necessary and Proper Clause, to create
federal procedural common law. See FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 4505, at 60 (1982).
10. See Note, Forum Selection Clauses in Light of the Erie Doctrine and Federal Common
Law: Stewart Organization v. Ricoh Corporation, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1090, 1091 n.12
(1988). The Erie doctrine is a federal common law doctrine embodied in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and its progeny. Id.
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procedural, thus creating an ambiguity as to whether federal or state law
provides the rule of decision."I
The Supreme Court's decision in Stewart Organizationv. Ricoh Corp. 12
settled the choice-of-law issue in cases where forum selection clauses
designate courts in the United States. Stewart arose out of a contractual
dispute between two United States parties, an Alabama dealer and a
New York manufacturer. The contract included a forum selection clause
designating courts in New York. Notwithstanding the forum selection
clause, the Alabama dealer brought a diversity suit against the New York
manufacturer in an Alabama federal district court. The New York party
moved the district court to transfer the case to the Southern District of
New York pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).13 The district court denied
the New York party's motion on the grounds that state law governed
enforceability of the forum selection clause and that under state law the
14
clause was unenforceable.
The Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to
transfer the case to the Southern District of New York, reasoning that
federal law governed and that under federal law, specifically the rule
articulated in the admiralty case, The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 15 the
16
forum selection clause was enforceable.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Eleventh Circuit's rejection of
state law but held that the Eleventh Circuit erred by transferring the
case based on The Bremen. The Court held that federal law governed the
issue, but that under Walker v. Armco Steel Corp.17 and Hanna v. Plumer18
the district court should have decided the New York party's motion to
enforce the forum selection clause by application of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a). 19 The Court further held that while the forum selection
clause was "a significant factor that figures centrally" in whether the district court should have transferred the case, other case-specific factors
such as the convenience of witnesses also should have been
20
considered.
11. The issue is procedural because the enforceability of forum selection clauses
determines the proper forum for litigation. The issue is substantive because forum
selection clauses are products of contractual bargaining and as such create rights and
obligations between the parties. See Farmland Industries v. Frazier-Parrott Commodities, 806 F.2d 848, 852 (8th Cir. 1986); Note, supra note 10, at 1091 n.12.
12. 108 S.Ct. 2239 (1988).
13. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) provides: "For the convenience of parties and witnesses,
in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other
district or division where it might have been brought."
14. Stewart v. Ricoh, 108 S.Ct. 2239, 2241 (citing Civ. Action No. 84-AR-2460-S
(Jan. 29, 1985)).
15. 407 U.S. 1 (1972). See supra note 9.
16. Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 810 F.2d 1066 (11 Cir. 1987) (en
banc), cert. granted, 108 S.Ct. 225 (1987).
17. 446 U.S. 740 (1980).
18. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
19. See supra note 13.
20. Stewart, 108 S.Ct. at 2243-44.
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Stewart did not resolve whether, in diversity suits, federal or state
law governs enforceability of forum selection clauses designatingforeign
courts. If A (U.S. citizen) and B (German citizen) agree to a forum selection clause that designates courts in Germany, and if A breaches the
clause by suing B in a United States federal court, B will move to enforce
the clause and dismiss the case. B cannot, however, move to transfer the
case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) because that provision governs
transfers exclusively within the federal system and does not give a federal court authority to transfer a case to a foreign court. 2 1 Therefore,
Stewart will not govern a federal court's determination of whether federal or state law governs the enforceability of such a clause. Rather,
22
federal courts will apply the Erie doctrine to decide the issue.
This Note will apply the Erie doctrine to determine whether, in
diversity cases, federal or state law governs enforceability of forum
selection clauses designating foreign courts. No court addressing this
choice-of-law issue yet has recognized the significance of the distinction
between clauses designating domestic courts and those designating foreign courts. Furthermore, in this context, no court has attempted a
proper application of the Erie doctrine to resolve the choice-of-law
23
issue.
This Note concludes that, unlike the holding in Stewart, under the
Erie doctrine federal diversity courts should apply state law to determine
21. See Greenberg,The Appropriate Source of Lawfor Forum Non Conveniens Decisions in
InternationalCases: A Proposalfor the Development of Federal Common Law, 4 INT'L TAX &
Bus. LAw. 155, 159 (1986).
B likewise will not move the court to dismiss the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1406(a) (giving the district courts authority to dismiss or transfer cases filed in
improper venues). As long as A sued B in the district of A's residence, see 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(a), or in a district in which B, if a corporation, has done business, see 28
U.S.C. § 1391(c), or in any district ifB is an alien, see 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d), venue is
proper for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), and B cannot get dismissal on this
ground. See Stewart, 108 S.Ct. at 2243 n.8; C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS, at
257 (4th ed. 1983).

Since the contractual forum is in a foreign country, B could move the court to
dismiss the case pursuant toforum non conveniens. See WRIGHT, supra at 260 (4th ed.
1983). B would not, however, choose to pursue this route to dismissal. In order to
obtain aforum non conveniens dismissal, B would have to prove not just that the parties
agreed to the foreign court, but also that other factors such as convenience to witnesses, interest of the forum, and location of evidence required dismissal. See Piper
Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
B would move the court to dismiss the case as a matter of pure contract
enforcement.
22. In dictum, Stewart stated that an Erie analysis is proper where no federal statute or rule governs the issue in dispute. Stewart, 108 S.Ct. at 2243 n.6. Because no
federal statute or rule governs motions to dismiss pursuant to forum selection
clauses designating foreign courts, the Erie doctrine governs the corresponding
choice of law issue.
23. See, e.g., Sun World Lines, Ltd. v. March Shipping Co., 801 F.2d 1066 (8th
Cir. 1986) (resolving the choice-of-law issue by simply stating that the enforceability
of forum selection clauses was procedural and that federal law governed). See also
Citro Florida v. Citrovale, 706 F.2d 1231 (11 th Cir. 1985) (applying federal law without addressing the choice-of-law issue).
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enforceability of forum selection clauses designating foreign courts.
This Note then addresses the potentially negative consequences of this
conclusion on U.S. participaion in international commerce and suggests
a possible federal common law alternative based on the foreign relations
"enclave" of federal common law.2 4 Finally, this Note concludes that,
although federal diversity courts may have support for creating governing federal common law, the complexity of interests surrounding the
issue ultimately counsels for judicial deference to Congress to develop
governing law.
II. Background
The Erie Doctrine and the "Enclave" Theory of Federal
Common Law
1. Introduction

A.

The Supreme Court in Swift v. Tyson 2 5 held that, in the absence of a state
statute or local custom, federal courts may apply federal general common law as the rule of decision in diversity cases. After 96 years of
applying the Swift rule, the Court in Erie Railroadv. Tompkins 26 dramatically narrowed the scope of federal judge-made law by declaring that
"there is no federal general common law." ' 2 7 The Erie Court concluded
that "[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by
Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the
28
State."
The Court acknowledged that federal power is only legitimate to
the extent that the Constitution grants it. 2 9 The Swift rule allowed federal judges to fashion law in areas not specifically designated by the
Constitution. The Erie Court corrected the situation by requiring that
federal courts apply state law to issues not within the federal government's power. 30 Erie did not hold that all federal judge-made law was
unconstitutional or improper. Erie simply required that federal courts
create such law only in areas authorized by the Constitution or federal
3
statutes. 1
a.

Federal Procedural Common Law

While Erie did not specify definitively the areas in which the Constitution
authorizes the creation of federal judge-made law, the decision did suggest one area in which such law is proper. In his concurrence, Justice
24. See Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981);

Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398
25. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 18 (1842).

(1964).

26. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
27. Id. at 78.
28. Id.
29. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Lau', 99 HARV. L. REV. 883.
899 (1986).
30. See 19 FEDERAL PRAcTIcE, supra note 9, at 53.
31. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78. See also FEDERAL PRAcTICE, supra note 9. at 55.
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Reed stated, "no one doubts federal power over procedure." ' 32 Justice
Reed reasoned that the Article III grant of federal judicial power and the
Necessary and Proper Clause 3 3 of Article I authorize creation of procedural law by federal courts. 34 Justice Reed's opinion thus foreshadowed
the emergence of federal procedural common law.
b. Federal Common Law
In Hinderliderv. La Plata River and Cherry Creek Ditch Co. ,35 decided on the
same day as Erie, the Court addressed a dispute between states over the
right to water in interstate streams. Finding that no federal statute governed the issue, the Court properly resolved it by applying federal
judge-made law. The Court declared that, "whether the water of an
interstate stream must be apportioned between the two States is a question of 'federal common law' upon which neither the statutes nor the
'36
decisions of either state can be conclusive."
Although the Court decided Hinderlider the same day as Erie, it did
not address the tension between its statement in Erie that "there is no
federal general common law" 37 and its statement in Hinderlider that the
issue of states' rights to interstate streams is a question of "federal common law." 3 8 Nor did the Court address the apparent inconsistency
between its statement in Erie that "[e]xcept in matters governed by the
Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any
case is the law of the State" 3 9 and its failure to apply state law in Hinderlider in the absence of any such constitutional provision or governing
40
federal statute.
Nonetheless, Hinderliderdid show that, although there is no "federal
general common law," federal courts may legitimately fashion federal
judge-made law to govern certain substantive issues, and that, although
the federal judge-made law must be based on some constitutional or
statutory enactment, its scope is not limited to mere judicial interpretation of those governing federal enactments. Hinderlider stands as an
4
example of federal common law. '
32. Erie, 304 U.S. at 92 (Reed, J., concurring).
33. "Congress shall have Power to... make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested
by this Constitution.. . " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
34. Erie, 304 U.S. 64, 92 (1938) (Reed, J., concurring). See also Hanna v. Plumer,
380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965) (Article III grant of federal judicial power and the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article I authorize Congress to create rules governing
procedure in federal courts). Although the Hanna court only addresses constitutional authorization for Congress to create procedural laws, the same constitutional
provisions authorize federal courts to create federal procedural common law. 19
FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 9, at 60.

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

304 U.S. 92 (1938).
Id. at 110.
Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
Hinderlider,304 U.S. at 110. See Field, supra note 29, at 908.
Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
See C. WRIGHT, supra note 21, at 388.
See id.
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2.

The Erie Doctrine

a.

The Choice-of-Law Analysis After Erie

The Erie court declared that federal courts exceeded the limits of their
constitutional law-making power by creating general, substantive common law in diversity cases. In his concurrence, however, Justice Reed
recognized federal power over procedure in federal courts. 4 2 Thus Erie
seemed to establish a choice-of-law rule based on the dichotomy
between substance and procedure: 4 3 federal courts should apply state
law to substantive issues and federal law to procedural issues.
This seemingly simple choice of law technique buckled, however,
when issues could not be easily characterized as either substantive or
procedural. To avoid difficulties inherent in the substance-procedure
Trust Co. v. York, 44 the first
dichotomy, the Court announced, in Guaranty
45
Erie.
of
of three major reformulations
b.

The First Reformulation of Erie

In Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 4 6 the plaintiff sued in federal district court
on a state claim after the state statute of limitations had tolled. The
district court faced the choice-of-law issue of whether to apply the state
statute of limitations and dismiss the case or whether to ignore the state
statute and entertain the plaintiff's claim. If the court deemed the statute of limitations as substantive, Erie presumably compelled application
of the statute and dismissal of the case. If, however, the statute was procedural, Erie would allow the district court to ignore its limitations and
entertain the suit.
To avoid the problem of characterization, the Court formulated the
"outcome-determinative" test. The 'outcome-determinative"
test
resolved the choice-of-law issue by requiring the federal court to apply
state law if failure to do so would affect the outcome of the case. 4 7 The
Court based the test on its belief that, because its jurisdiction rested
solely on diversity of citizenship, "the outcome of the litigation in the
federal court should be substantially the same ...as it would be if tried
48
in a State court."
42. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
43. See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941) (recognizing the substanceprocedure dichotomy); see also C. WRIGHT, supra note 21, at 377.

44. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
45. 19 FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 9, § 4504, at 23 (adopting the word "reformulation" and outlining the three reformulations of Erie). The section of this Note
providing background on the Erie doctrine is based, in large part, on the account of
Erie's evolution in 19 FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 9, § 4504.
46. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).

47. Id. at 109.
48. Id. As applied to the facts of Guaranty Trust, the "outcome-determinative" test

clearly required the federal court to apply the state statute of limitations since failure

to do so would affect the outcome of the case. If the court applied the state statute,
the defendant would prevail; if it did not apply the state statute, the defendant would

have to defend on the merits.
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Lower federal courts followed Guaranty Trust and applied the outcome-determinative test to resolve choice-of-law disputes. Application
of the test, however, became undesirably mechanical. 4 - Any difference
between the most arbitrary procedural rules of federal and state courts
could affect the outcome of a case given the right set of facts. 50 If literally applied, the outcome-determinative test could threaten to vitiate
most of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 5 ' Litigants would resist
conformity with the Federal Rules for fear that an opponent would
assert nonconformity with state law and avert litigation.
c.

The Second Reformulation of Erie

The deficiencies of the outcome-determinative test led the Court, in Byrd
z.. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Co.,52 to the second reformulation of Erie.53
The issue in Byrd was whether federal or state law governs who defines a
statutory employee under the South Carolina Workmen's Compensation
Act. Federal procedural common law required that the jury decide the
issue, whereas South Carolina's common law required the judge to
decide.
In resolving the choice-of-law problem, the Court implemented a
balancing test. Two interests leaned in favor of state law: the state's
interests in advancing its policies through application of its laws, 5- 4 and
the interest identified in Guaranty Trust that the outcome of litigation in
federal court resemble the outcome had the case been brought in state
court.55 Balanced against these two interests were countervailing fed56
eral interests in applying federal law.
49. C. WRIGHT, supra note 21, at 357.
50. See Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949). In
Ragan, the plaintiff sued in federal court alleging a state-law tort injury that had a
two-year statute of limitations. Plaintiff filed the claim within two years, but did not
personally serve defendant until just after two years. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure dictate that an action commences when the claim is filed with the court. FED.
R. CI\. P. 3. Under applicable state law, however, an action is commenced when the
plaintiffserves the defendant. The Court held that the "outcome-determinative" test
compelled the court to apply state law and dismiss the case.
51. C. WRIrr, supra note 21, at 357.
52. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
53. See supra note 45.
54. Byrd, 356 U.S. at 535.
55. Id. at 536-37.
56. Id. at 537-38. A literal reading of Byrd requires a different interpretation of
the balancing test. Under the literal reading, Byrd is a two-step test. Instead of balancing all three factors simultaneously, the literal interpretation requires initial
examination ofjust the state interest factor. If the court concludes that the state law
is "bound up" with "state-created rights and obligations," it must apply state law
without regard to the "outcome-determinative" effect of applying federal law or to
the countervailing federal interest in the application of federal law. Byrd, 356 U.S. at
535. If, however, the state law is not "bound up" with "state-created rights and obligations," the court proceeds to balance the "outcome-determinative" effect of applying federal law against the countervailing federal interest in the application of federal
law. Redish & Phillips, Erie and the Rules of Decision Act: In Search of the Appropriate
.Dilemma, 91 HxRv. L. REv'. 356. 364 (1977/78).
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The Byrd court made three preliminary findings. First, the basis of
57
Secthe state law was historical and created no rights and obligations.
ond, applying federal law would not likely produce a result different
than that had plaintiff sued in state court. 58 Finally, federal courts possessed a strong interest in having juries resolve disputed fact quesfederal ones,
tions. 59 Balancing the weak state interests against stronger
60
the Court determined that federal law should apply.
Byrd identified three types of countervailing federal interests strong
enough to enter the balance in any given case. 61 The first is the federal
62
system's interest in distributing trial functions between judge and jury.
The second is the "strong federal policy against allowing state rules to
disrupt the judge-jury relationship in the federal courts." 63 The third
derives from the nature of the federal system as "an independent system
for administering justice to litigants who properly invoke its
Professors Redish and Phillips conclude that the Byrd Court, if faced with deciding
between the two interpretations, would embrace the non-literal interpretation-the
one in which all three factors are balanced simultaneously. Redish and Phillips reach
this conclusion by reasoning that if the state interest in the application of a state law
was negligible, but the law was indeed "bound up" with "state-created rights and
obligations," the Court would not apply the state law in the face of the strong countervailing federal interest in the application of federal law. Id. at 365.
Lower courts split on the issue of which Byrd interpretation was proper. See 19
FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 9, § 4504, at 33 (1982) (citing cases). Courts that
applied the non-literal, "three-factors-balanced-simultaneously" interpretation
include Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co. v. Wright, 322 F.2d 759, 764-65 (5th Cir.
1963); Monarch Ins. Co. v. Spach, 281 F.2d 401, 406 (5th Cir. 1960); Seaboard Fin.
Co. v. Davis, 276 F. Supp. 507, 515 (N.D. Ill. 1967). Courts which applied the literal,
two-step interpretation include Miller v. Davis, 507 F.2d 308, 314 (6th Cir. 1974):
Poitra v. Demarrias, 502 F.2d 23, 26 (8th Cir. 1974), cerl. denied, 421 U.S. 934 (1974);
Atkins v. Schmutz Mfg. Co., 435 F.2d 527, 536 (4th Cir. 1970), cerl. denied, 402 U.S.
932 (1971); Knaver v.Johns-Manville Corp., 638 F. Supp. 1369, 1379 (D. Md. 1986).
57. Byrd, 356 U.S. at 535.
58. Id. at 539.
59. Id. at 537-38.
60. Id. at 538.
61. Byrd did not state that the following three interests were exhaustive. However, the legitimacy of any other countervailing federal interests must be assessed
with reference to the following analysis. If countervailing federal interests tip the
balance in favor of application of federal law, the court will apply federal procedural
common law-in the absence of a federal rule or procedural statute directly on point.
All legitimate federal procedural common law must be authorized, explicitly or
implicitly, by the Article III grant of federal judicial power in conjunction with the
Necessary and Proper Clause of Article I. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying
text. Therefore, the countervailing federal interests which generate creation of federal procedural common law must also be legitimate in light of the Article III grant of
federal judicial power and the Necessary and Proper Clause. In other words, the type
of federal interests that may be included in the Byrd balance are those relating to the
smooth functioning of the federal court system.
62. Byrd, 356 U.S. at 537-538. See, e.g., Braud v. Baker, 324 F.2d 213, 216 (5th
Cir. 1963) (holding that federal law controls the issue of whether the evidence
presented at trial is sufficient to submit the case to the jury).
63. Byrd, 356 U.S. at 538. But see Redish & Phillips, supra note 56, at 387 ("absent
the support of the seventh amendment, it is not clear what specific federal interests
exist in this area").
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64

The Third Reformulation of Erie

While the Byrd test tempered the mechanical "outcome-determinative"
test of Guaranty Trust,6 5 it had problems of its own. Lower courts had
trouble quantifying the various interests, and balancing often led to
inconsistent results. 6 6 In its last reformulation of Erie,6 7 the Court in
Hanna v. Plumer68 addressed the choice-of-law issue raised by application of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure.
The specific issue in Hanna was whether a federal court should
apply federal or state law in determining the adequacy of service of process. The plaintiff had served the defendant properly according to Rule
4(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff's service did
not, however, satisfy a state statute at issue which required process to be
69
served in-hand.
The Court announced a new two-step analysis for resolving federalstate choice of law issues. First, the Court would decide whether a
valid 70 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure was on point. If so, the Federal
Rule controlled regardless of conflicting state law. 7 ' If no valid Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure applied, the Court considered application of
federal law in light of the "twin aims of Erie: discouragement of forum72
If
shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws."
64. Byrd, 356 U.S. at 537. See, e.g., Monarch Ins. Co.v. Spach, 281 F.2d 401 (5th
Cir. 1960) (in refusing to apply a state law governing admissibility of impeachment
evidence, the court regarded as indispensable the necessity that an independent federal court have "the capacity to regulate the manner by which cases are to be tried
and facts are to be presented in the search for truth .... Id. at 407).
65. See 19 FEDERAL PRAcTIcE, supra note 9, § 4504 at 35.

66. CompareJaftexCorp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc., 282 F.2d 508, 516 (2d Cir. 1960)
(federal law governs "presence" of foreign corporation for purposes of service of

process), with Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219, 224-25 (2d Cir. 1963)
(reversingJaflix and holding that state law governs the issue). See 19 FEDERAL PRACTIcE, supra note 9, § 4504, at 35.
67. See supra note 45.
68. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
69. The choice of law was clearly "outcome-determinative." Seesupra note 48 and
accompanying text. If the Court applied the Federal Rule, the defendant would have
to defend on the merits. If the Court applied the state rule, the state common law
required the Court to dismiss the case. See 19 FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 9,
§ 4504, at 35.
70. The validity of a federal rule is determined by reference to the Rules Enabling
Act, which provides: "Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.. " 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982). The Court in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312
U.S. I (1941), had previously held that a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure is valid as
authorized by the Rules Enabling Act if it "really regulates procedure,-the judicial
process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law .. " Id. at 14.
71. Hanna. 380 U.S. at 469-474. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 21, at 359.
72. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468. Intrastate forum shopping would occur if litigants
choose between federal and state courts within a particular state based on the realization that one forum offered more advantageous laws than the other. Inequitable
administration of the laws occurs when resident defendants are unable to neutralize
plaintiff's forum shopping by removing the case to federal court under 28 U.S.C.
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applying federal law led to a violation of Erie's twin aims, Hanna directed
the federal court to apply state law. Otherwise, the federal court would
be free to apply federal law.
The Hanna Court held that Guaranty Trust's "outcome-determina74
tive" test 73 must be understood in relation to "the twin aims of Erie."
Standing alone, the test fell short of the Court's desired result. Its
mechanical application blocked federal courts from applying federal law
which gave neither litigant an advantage at the outset of the case (and
thus did not encourage intrastate forum shopping), and which could
affect the outcome of the case only after a litigant has chosen the federal
forum and relied on the application of federal law. To remedy the test's
shortcomings, the Court stressed that it must be applied with reference
to Erie's twin aims. 75 Thus, an "outcome-determinative" application of
forum shopping and
federal law is only undesirable if it encourages
76
results in an inequitable administration of law.
e.

The Present Form of the Erie Doctrine

The Hanna choice-of-law analysis differs from the Byrd analysis in three
significant ways. First, Hanna applies a definite choice-of-law rule where
a valid Federal Rule of Civil Procedure is involved: the Federal Rule
controls regardless of conflicting state law. Second, Hanna redefined
the "outcome-determinative" factor in the Byrd balance. 77 Hanna stated
that an "outcome-determinative" application of federal law is only
undesirable if the federal law encourages forum shopping and results in
an inequitable administration of the laws. Third, Hanna eliminated the
balancing of the other two factors in the Byrd balance, i.e., state interests
78
in applying state law and federal interests in applying federal law.
Because the Hanna approach fails to consider relevant state and federal interests in resolving choice-of-law problems, and because Hanna
never actually overruled Byrd,79 many lower courts have replaced the
second step in the Hanna analysis (the step taken where no federal rule
by Hanna's
or statute is on point) with the Byrd balancing test, modified
80
redefinition of the "outcome-determinative" factor.
§ 1441 (removal statute). See generally, Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 108 S. Ct.

2249 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
73. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
74. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 466-68. 19 FEDERAL PRACTICE,
(1982).

supra note

9, § 4504, at 38

75. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468.
76. Although it announced a two-step analysis, the Court in Hanna did not need
to reach the second step. The Court resolved the choice of law issue by declaring
that the federal law in question was a valid Federal Rule of Civil Procedure and thus
applied regardless of conflicting state law.
77.

19 FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 9, § 4504, at 42-43.

78. Id.
79. Because a federal rule existed in Hanna, the Court's alteration of the Byrd test
was dictum.
80. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 21, at 386; Redish & Phillips, supra note 56, at 36972.
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Under this hybrid formulation, the court first determines whether a
valid federal rule or statute applies. If no such rule or law applies, the
court moves to the Byrd balancing test, modified by Hanna's redefinition
of the "outcome-determinative" factor. With the modification, the Byrd
test balances the state's interest in advancing its substantive policies
through application of its laws and the Erie interest in discouraging
forum shopping and avoiding inequitable administration of law against
countervailing federal interest in applying federal law. 8 1
Not all federal courts since Hanna have applied a Hanna-Byrd hybrid
choice-of-law analysis. In fact, many federal courts, including the
Supreme Court, have applied the pure Hanna analysis without any mention of Byrd's balancing technique. 82 Representative of these cases is
83
JWalker v. Arnco Steel Corp.
Valker was a tort action in federal court in which the plaintiff's claim
was barred by a state statute requiring the plaintiff to serve the defendant within two years of the accident, or within 60 days after filing, to toll
the statute of limitations. Plaintiff argued that, while he admittedly
failed to comply with the state statute, his compliance with Rule 3 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure tolled the statute of limitations.
The Supreme Court held that Rule 3 was irrelevant to the tolling of
a state statute of limitations and that therefore the choice-of-law issue
(the applicability of the state law in federal court) did not involve a federal rule. 84 The Court went on to consider whether its failure to apply
the state law would encourage forum shopping or result in inequitable
administration of law. It decided that while a failure to apply state law
81. The Fourth Circuit in Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 349 F.2d 60 (4th Cir.
1965) applied this hybrid approach to a wrongful death action filed in a South Carolina federal district court. While the federal court had diversity jurisdiction, a South
Carolina statute denied jurisdiction to South Carolina courts where, as here, the
plaintiff was not a citizen of South Carolina and the cause of action arose under the
laws of another state (in this case, Tennessee). Only if the state law did not apply
could the federal court hear the case.
Szantay did not involve a Federal Rule or statute; the issue was whether or not to
apply the state law. Thus the court considered the potential for forum shopping and
concluded that failure to apply the state statute would encourage it. The Hama analysis would have compelled the court to apply the state statute and dismiss the case,
but the court went on to balance the relevant state and federal interests. Id. at 60.
The court concluded that the state interest in applying state law was uncertain.
Moreover, it identified several countervailing federal interests in not applying state
law, including refraining from jurisdictional discrimination against out-of-state plaintiffs and encouraging efficient joinder in multi-party suits. Id. at 65-66. The court
therefore refused to apply the state law.
See also Feinstein v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 643 F.2d 880 (1981) (holding that
the federal court must apply state statute requiring malpractice plaintiffs to seek remedy at special tribunal before pursuing judicial relief); Hargrave v. OKI Nursery, Inc.,
646 F.2d 716 (1980) (holding that federal law determines to which claims jurisdiction
extends); Atkins v. Schmutz Mfg. Co., 435 F.2d 527 (1970) (holding that federal law
determines the events which toll the state statute of limitations).
82. See C. WRiGHT, supra note 2 1, at 386.
83. 446 U.S. 740 (1980).

84. Id. at 751.
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might not encourage forum shopping, it would be an inequitable administration of the law since the exclusion of state law would result from the
"fortuity" of diversity of citizenship. 8 5 Accordingly, without balancing
state and federal interests, the Court held that the district court properly
applied the state law.
While no post-Hanna Supreme Court decision has repudiated the
Byrd balancing technique, 8 6 none has used it either. In light of the contrast between Walker, which applied Hanna without mention of Byrd balancing, and lower federal court cases utilizing Byrd balancing,8 7 the
balancing technique remains viable but not preferred.
The "Enclave" Theory of Federal Common Law

3.

The power of the federal government is limited to that authorized by
specific constitutional provisions.88 The Article III grant of federal judicial power augmented by the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article I
authorizes federal courts to make federal judge-made law ("Federal Procedural Common Law") governing federal court procedure. 89 Article
III does not, however, authorize federal courts to create law governing
substantive issues. 90 The Erie doctrine determines whether federal
judge-made law is procedural and thus applicable to diversity cases
under Article III's grant of judicial power, or substantive and thus
proscribed in diversity cases by the absence of constitutional
91
authorization.
The Erie doctrine is not always determinative of the constitutionality
of federal judge-made law, however. Federal judge-made law may be
based on constitutional provisions other than Article III, in which case
Erie is inapplicable. 9 2 Furthermore, federal judge-made law based on
constitutional provisions other than Article III's grant of judicial power
("Federal Common Law") is binding on state courts through the
93
Supremacy Clause.
85. Id. at 753.
86. C. WRIGHT, supra note 21, at 386.
87. See, e.g., Feinstein v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 643 F.2d 880 (1st Cir. 1981);
Hargrave v. OKI Nursery, Inc., 646 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1980); Atkins v. Schmutz Mfg.
Co., 435 F.2d 527 (4th Cir. 1970).
88. Field, supra note 29, at 899.
89. See supra note 34.
90. Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 108 S.Ct. 2239, 2248 (1988)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (1988); Field, supra note 29, at 982 (Art. III's grant of diversity

jurisdiction does not authorize creation of substantive federal common law).

91. Stewart, 108 S.Ct. at 2248 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
92. See United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979); Clearfield Trust
Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943) (holding Erie inapplicable in ruling that the
Constitution authorizes federal judge-made law governing the government's rights

and obligations on its commercial paper).
93. Friendly, hi Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common Lau, 39 N.Y.U. L.
383, 405 (1964). The federal judge-made law based solely on Article III is not
binding on state courts through the Supremacy Clause because Article III authorizes
regulation of federal court procedure and not that of state courts.
REv.
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In defining the scope of federal common law, the Court has adhered
to an enclave theory in which it simply lists specific areas or "enclaves"
in which federal common law exists and will be applied. 9 4 The sections
that follow identify some of the more important "enclaves" of federal
common law, including the one most pertinent to this Note, the foreign
relations enclave.
a.

The Admiralty Enclave

The admiralty enclave initially arose out of a need for a nationally uniform body of maritime law. 95 The Supreme Court in Southern Pacific Co.
97
v. Jensen96 held that the constitutional grant of admiralty jurisdiction
gave federal courts power to create federal common law to govern admiralty cases. 98 The Supreme Court recently has affirmed this view, stating, "We consistently have interpreted the grant of general admiralty
jurisdiction .. .as a proper basis for the development of judge-made
99
rules of maritime law."
b.

The Clearfield Enclave of U.S. Rights and Obligations

In Clearfield Trust Company v. United States, 0 0 the Supreme Court
addressed a dispute over the rights and duties of the United States on its
commercial paper. In holding that federal common law governed the
case, the Court reasoned that, because the Constitution authorized the
government to issue the commercial paper, federal courts were authorized to create federal common law governing the rights and obligations
0 1
on that commercial paper.
For a discussion of the relationship between federal common law and federal procedural common law, see Bourne, Federal Common Law and the Erie-Byrd Rule, 12

BALT.

L. REV. 427 (1982-83).

94. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981) ("federal common law exists only in such narrow areas as those concerned with the rights
and obligations of the United States, interstate and international disputes implicating
the conflicting rights of States or our relations with foreign nations, and admiralty
cases").

For more systematic approaches to defining the scope of federal common law, see
Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHi. L. REv. 1 (1985). Profes-

sor Merrill argues that the creation of federal common law is legitimate if any of the
following three questions is answered in the affirmative: (1) can the federal common
law be derived from a textual interpretation of the Constitution, a U.S. treaty, or a
federal statute?; (2) is the federal common law necessary to effectuate a federal policy

which can be derived from a textual interpretation of the Constitution, a U.S. treaty,
or a federal statute?; (3) is there evidence, based on a textual interpretation of the
Constitution, a U.S. treaty, or a federal statute, that law-making power has been delegated to federal courts in a reasonably circumscribed manner? Id. at 47.
95. See Bourne, supra note 93, at 431.
96. 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
97. See supra note 9.
98. Southern Pacific, 244 U.S. at 214-15.
99. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of America, 451 U.S.
77, 95-96 (1981).
100. 318 U.S. 363 (1943).

101. Id. at 366-67.
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More recently, in U.S. v. Kimbell Foods. Inc. 102 the U.S. government
acquired a lien over a farmer's tractor to cover a defaulted government
loan. A repairman obtained a second lien for unpaid repairs on the tractor. In deciding which lien had priority, the Court first resolved the corresponding federal-state choice of law issue.
Applying federal common law, the Court stated that it "consistently
held that federal law governs questions involving the rights of the
United States arising under nationwide federal programs."' 0 3 The
Court further reasoned that authority to create such law existed in the
provisions that permitted the U.S. government to
same constitutional
10 4
issue the loan.
c.

The Jurisdictional Grant Enclave

The Supreme Court's most expansive use of federal common law
appeared in Textile Workers Union ofAmerica v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama.' 0 5
Lincoln Mills held that Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 10 6 which gives federal courts jurisdiction over contract disputes between employers and labor unions, authorizes federal courts to
create a governing body of federal common law. The Court reasoned
that the congressional policy for enacting the statute-promotion of collective bargaining agreements-would be vitiated if federal courts had
to resolve labor disputes by applying state law.10 7 Because Congress
had the initial constitutional authority to put its collective bargaining
policy into law, the federal courts had corresponding constitutional
authority to protect that policy. 10 8
d. The Foreign Relations Enclave
The Court in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino 10 9 formulated the foreign relations enclave of federal common law. In Sabbatino, Cuba sued a
Cuban corporation in the Southern District of New York for conversion
of government property. The district court found for the defendant on
the ground that the Cuban law bestowing ownership of the property on
the Cuban government contradicted international law and was therefore
invalid. The Second Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed on
the ground that the district court should have followed the act of state
doctrine, a federal common law doctrine forbidding courts in the United
States from passing on the validity of foreign laws, 1 10 which compelled
102.
103.
104.
105.

440 U.S. 715 (1979).
Id. at 726.
Id.
353 U.S. 448 (1957).

106. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982).
107. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 456.
108. Id. at 457. See also Merrill, supra note 94, at 47 (federal common law is constitutionally authorized if it is necessary to effectuate congressional policies derived

from a textual interpretation of a federal statute).
109. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
110. See Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).

Cornell International Law Journal

161. 22

the district court to uphold the Cuban law.' '' In rejecting state law in
favor of federal judge-made law, the Court created a foreign relations
enclave of federal common law applicable in diversity cases.' 12
The Court conceded that the Constitution did not require application of the act of state doctrine. 1 3 Nonetheless, it asserted three constitutionally-based grounds for the creation of federal common law in this
area.'14 First, the act of state doctrine implicated the constitutional
notion of separation of powers in that it prohibits U.S. courts from passing on the validity of foreign laws in the interest of leaving that responsibility with the executive branch, which has greater competence in
foreign affairs."i 5 Second, the doctrine is based on the constitutional
notion of federalism. The Court determined that state law should not
undermine federal interests in ordering relations with foreign countries."i 6 Finally, the Court reasoned that the numerous constitutional
provisions granting the federal government power over foreign relations indirectly support federal-court creation of the act-of-state
doctrine. 117
B.

Cases Addressing the Choice-of-Law Issue Where the Forum
Selection Clause Designates Foreign Courts

The most significant case for resolving the question of which law should
govern the enforceability of forum selection clauses designating foreign
courts is Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp.' 1I Although Stewart dealt
only with enforceability of forum selection clauses designating U.S.
courts, the Supreme Court suggested, in dictum, the proper analysis for
determining which law to apply to forum selection clauses designating
foreign courts. Citing Hanna, the Stewart Court noted that where no federal rule or statute governs a particular issue, federal courts should be
111. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 439.
112. See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S

THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, 806 (2d ed. 1973); Hill, The LawMaking Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional Preemption. 67 COLUM. L. REX'. 1024,
1066 (1967); Comment, FederalCommon Law and .irticle III: A Jurisdictional Approach to
Erie, 74 YALE L.J. 325, 336 (1964-65).
113. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423.
114. But see, Henkin, The Foreign Afla's Power of the Federal Court: Sabbatino. 64
COLUM. L. REV. 805 (1964) (claiming that the constitutional authorization for the act
of state doctrine is uncertain).
115. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423.
116. Id. at 427.
117. Among the provisions cited were the Commerce Clause, Article I, § 8, cl.3,
("the Congress shall have the Power to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations....
,") and the Article III, § 2 grant ofjudicial power over "controversies... between a
state, or a citizen thereof, and foreign states, citizens or subjects." See Sabbatino, 376
U.S. at 427 n.25.
The Court recently reaffirmed its creation of the foreign relations enclave in Texas
Indus. Inc. v. RadcliffAaterials. Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981). In Radcff, the Court stated
that "federal common law exists only in such narrow areas as ... international disputes implicating ... our relations with foreign nations ..... Id. at 641.
118. 108 S.Ct. 2239 (1988).
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guided by the "twin aims of Erie" in deciding whether to apply federal or
state law. 1 9 Since no federal rule or statute governs enforceability of
forum selection clauses designating foreign courts, the Stewart decision
suggests that federal courts should consider the "twin aims of Erie" in
120
deciding whether federal or state law governs this issue.
This dictum in Stewart is particularly helpful given the dual
approaches federal courts have taken in applying the Eie doctrine.
While the Supreme Court since Hanna has resolved choice-of-law
problems not involving a federal rule or statute solely by considering the
twin aims of Erie, some lower federal courts have considered both Eie's
twin aims and Byrd's balancing of federal and state interests in resolving
these problems.' 2 t Stewart suggests, however, that at the very least,
Byrd-type balancing is an improper choice-of-law technique when deciding the law applicable to forum selection clause enforceability, and that a
federal court should decide the choice-of-law issue solely with reference
1 22
to Erie's twin aims.
At the time of this writing, no federal case since Stewart has
addressed the choice-of-law issue in the context of forum selection
clauses designating foreign courts. Cases that addressed the issue prior
to Stewart failed to apply the proper choice-of-law analysis. The preStewart case which addressed the issue most directly is Sun World Lines,
Ltd. v. March Shipping Co. 123 Sun World involved a contract between U.S.
and German parties. The contract contained a forum selection clause
designating German courts. Despite the clause, the U.S. party sued in
the Federal District Court of Eastern Missouri.
The issue on appeal was whether federal or state law governed
enforceability of the clause. The Eighth Circuit recognized that the
choice-of-law issue was of first impression and relied on cases from Missouri federal district courts to hold that the issue, although somewhat
substantive in nature, is most properly characterized as procedural and
that federal law therefore applied. The court adopted the enforceability
12 4
rule in the admiralty case, The Bremen, and dismissed the case.
The Eighth Circuit in Sun World erred in two ways. First, it failed to
recognize the flaws in the district courts's analyses on which it relied.
These district courts addressed the choice-of-law issue in the context of
forum selection clauses designating U.S. courts, holding that the issue
119. 108 S.Ct. at 2243 n.6.
120. See supra text accompanying notes 21-22.
121. See supra notes 79-87 and accompanying text.

122. Because Steu'arl did not decide the law applicable to the enforceability of
forum-selection clauses designating foreign courts, it is improper to conclude that
the Supreme Court sanctions the twin aims of Erie and not the Byrd balancing
approach as the exclusive means for resolving this choice of law problem. The case
does suggest, however, that forum selection clauses, in general, present no considerations which would compel the Court to deviate from its course of resolving choice of
law problems without Byrd balancing.
123. 801 F.2d 1066 (8th Cir. 1986).
124. Id. at 1068-69. See supra note 9.
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was procedural and that therefore federal law, namely the Bremen rule,
governed. 12 5 The flaw in these opinions was apparent after the Stewart
Court held that 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), not the Bremen rule, governed
12 6
enforceability of these clauses.
The Eighth Circuit's second error was in failing to recognize that
the choice-of-law analysis drawn from cases involving forum selection
clauses designating U.S. courts did not apply to a case where the clause
designated a foreign court. Stewart showed that the two types of clauses
require different choice-of-law analyses. A federal statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a), governs motions to transfer based on forum selection clauses
designating U.S. courts. But no federal rule or statute controls motions
to dismiss based on forum selection clauses designating foreign courts.
Therefore, following Hanna, federal courts should consider Erie's twin
28
aims 127 in deciding which law to apply.'
Other cases dealing with enforceability of forum-selection clauses
designating foreign courts have not directly addressed the choice-of-law
issue. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Islamic Rep. of Iran 129 involved a contract between a U.S. corporation and the Iranian Air Force which
included a forum-selection clause designating courts in Iran. The court
applied the Bremen rule to decide enforceability even though The Bremen
was an admiralty case and thus not controlling in diversity cases. 130
Because the parties failed to argue that The Bremen was inapplicable, the
court assumed for purposes of argument that the case controlled. 13 1
Finally, in Citro Florida, Inc. v. Citrovale, S.A. ,132 the Eleventh Circuit
addressed a dispute over the enforceability of a forum-selection clause
designating courts in Brazil. Although Citro Florida was a diversity
case,13 3 the court nevertheless applied the Bremen rule without mention34
ing that its applicability is limited to admiralty cases.1
125. See Benge v. Software Galeria, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 601 (E.D. Mo. 1985); Quick
Erectors, Inc. v. Seattle Bronze Corp., 524 F. Supp. 351 (E.D. Mo. 1981); Dick Proctor Imports, Inc. v. Sumitomo Corp. of America, 486 F. Supp. 815 (E.D. Mo. 1980).
126. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.

Sun World was distinguished in a subsequent Eighth Circuit case, Farmland Industries v. Frazier-Parrott Commodities, 806 F.2d 848, 852 (8th Cir. 1986). Farmland

Industries held that state law governed enforceability of a forum selection clause
designating courts in the United States. The court distinguished Sun World on the
basis that its diversity holding was not essential to its outcome since the court also
had admiralty jurisdiction over the case and thus could apply the Bremen rule as fed-

eral common law within the admiralty enclave of federal common law. See supra note
9 and notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
129. 758 F.2d 341 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 948 (1985).

130. See supra note 9.
131. McDonnell, 758 F.2d at 345 n.4.
132. 760 F.2d 1231 (11th Cir. 1985).
133. The Citro Florida Court does not state specifically under what jurisdiction it
heard the case. A subsequent case in the same circuit, however, noted that Citro Florida was a diversity case. See Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 810 F.2d 1066,
1069 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc), aff'd, 108 S.Ct. 225 (1988).
134. See supra note 9.
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III. Analysis
A.

Applying the Erie Doctrine to Forum Selection Clauses
Designating Foreign Courts

Federal diversity courts should apply the Erie doctrine to determine
which law governs enforceability of forum selection clauses designating
foreign courts. Once a party seeking enforcement of such a clause
moves the U.S. court to dismiss the case, there are three possible ways
the federal court could frame the choice-of-law issue.
1.

No Federal Law Governs Enforceability of Forum Selection Clauses
DesignatingForeign Courts

First, the federal diversity court may find that no federal law governs the
enforceability of forum selection clauses designating foreign courts. A
court reasoning as such would not apply the Bremen rule because admiralty cases do not control issues in diversity cases. 1 35 Such a court also
would conclude that the moving party was not seeking dismissal under
forum non conveniens. Whereas that doctrine allows dismissal based on
considerations of fairness to the parties, convenience of witnesses, interest of the forum, and accessibility of evidence, 13 6 the party seeking dismissal in this case, the court would reason, wants the federal court to
dismiss only on the basis of the parties' contractual agreement to limit
litigation to a foreign court.
The choice-of-law issue therefore would be characterized as deciding whether to apply state law. If the federal court applied state law in a
state enforcing forum selection clauses, 13 7 the court would dismiss the
case. If the court applied state law that does not enforce forum selection
clauses, 138 the court would deny the motion to dismiss. If, however,
state law did not apply, the federal court would always hear the case,
reasoning that federal law simply does not provide a mechanism by
which a party in a diversity suit may move to dismiss such a case. 139 The
court would examine the twin aims of Erie in deciding whether to apply
state law.
Whether to apply state law to an issue on which no federal law
exists was precisely the issue in Walker v. Armco Steel Corp.140 Walker
addressed whether a federal diversity court should apply a state statute
requiring plaintiffs to serve process on defendants to toll the statute of
limitations. The Court held that Federal Rule 3141 was not intended to
135. Id.
136. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981).

137. See supra note 7 (states enforcing forum selection clauses).
138. Id. (states denying enforcment of forum selection clauses).
139. See supra note 21 (explaining why 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a)-dismissal for
improper venue-does not provide such a mechanism).

140. 446 U.S. 740 (1980).
141. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3 states that "[a] civil action is commenced by
filing a complaint with the court."
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toll statutes of limitations, 14 2 and that no other federal law governed the
tolling of the statute of limitations in issue. Turning to the twin aims of
Erie, the Court found that failure to apply state law would not encourage
forum shopping but would create an inequitable administration of the
law since the "fortuity" of diversity jurisdiction would affect the outcome of the case. 143 Accordingly, the Court applied state law.
Based on the analysis of JWalker, federal diversity courts determining
that no federal law governs enforceability of forum selection clauses
designating foreign courts should apply state law to determine the issue.
Failure to do so would affect the outcome of the case in those states
enforcing forum selection clauses-a motion to dismiss would be
granted under state law but denied without application of state law.
H'alker characterizes the situation where a diversity court's failure to
apply state law would affect the outcome as an inequitable administration of law.144 In order to avoid this inequitable administration of law,
federal courts should apply state law to determine enforceability of
forum-selection clauses.
Moreover, the argument for state law in this context is even
stronger than in Walker because, unlike in Walker, failure to apply state
law in this context would encourage forum-shopping. Within states that
embrace forum-selection clauses, plaintiffs attempting to evade a forumselection clause would sue in federal rather than state court. The state
court would enforce the clause and dismiss the case, whereas the federal
court would deny the defendant's motion to dismiss. Clearly, a federal
court's failure to apply state law to the issue of enforceability of forumselection clauses designating foreign courts disserves the "twin aims of
Erie." Federal courts should therefore apply state law to resolve the
issue.

14

5

142. llIaher, 446 U.S. at 750.
143. Id. at 753. Note that the Court's interpretation of the second of Erie's twin
aims, avoidance of inequitable administration of law, is equivalent to the outcomedeterminative test of Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). See supra notes
46-48 and accompanying text.
144. Walker, 446 U.S. at 753.
145. This analysis illustrates a method by which litigants may circumvent Stewart
Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 108 S. Ct. 2239 (1988), in the context of forum
selection clauses designating U.S. courts.
If after A and B contract to litigate future disputes in state Y, A sues B in state X. B
will want to transfer the case to state Y. If B moves to transfer the case under 28
U.S.C. § 1404(a), however, the federal court, following Stewart, will consider the parties' forum selection clause as only one of several factors controlling transfer. See
Stewart, 108 S. Ct. at 2244 (indicating that factors such as convenience of witnesses
would also be considered). If the court grants the transfer of the case, the federal
court in state Y will apply the law ofstate X. See Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612.
636-37 (1964).
Instead of moving for transfer under § 1404(a), however, B could simply move to

dismiss on the grounds that A and B agreed not to litigate in any state other than
state Y. If state X enforces forum selection clauses, B could argue that, while
§ 1404(a) governs transfer motions, no federal law governs motions to disnis.%cases
based on forum selection clauses, and that under l'alker and the Erie doctrine, the
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Forum Non Conveniens Governs Enforceability of Forum-Selection Clauses
DesignatingForeign Courts

Federal diversity courts may frame the choice-of-law issue as a choice
between applying either state law governing enforceability of forum
selection clauses or the federal judge-made law of forum non conveniens. 146 A court framing the issue in this way would reason that,
because the defendant seeks dismissal to sue in a foreign court, the
defendant is invoking forum non conveniens, even though the defendant
wishes the court to dismiss solely on the basis of the parties' contractual
agreement to litigate in the foreign court. 147
Under the Erie doctrine, the court will first ascertain whether a valid
federal rule or statute controls the issue. 148 Forum non conveniens is a
federal judge-made doctrine and as such does not apply automatically.
Under the second step of the Erie analysis, the court must determine
whether a particular judge-made law is authorized under Article III augmented by the Necessary and Proper Clause. This is accomplished by
determining whether application of the federal judge-made law would
disserve the twin aims of Erie. 14 9 If application of federal law would disserve Erie's twin aims, the federal courts should apply state law. Otherwise, the federal court may apply the federal law. 150
Faced with a conflict between state law andforum non conveniens, the
Erie doctrine directs federal courts to apply state law since application of
forum non conveniens would violate Erie's twin aims. In those states enforcing forum selection clauses, application of forum non conveniens would
encourage forum shopping. The breaching party would sue in federal
court because, if the party sued in state court, the defendant would
move to dismiss the case successfully under the forum selection clause.
By suing in federal court, the breaching party forces the defendant to
move for dismissal underforum non conveniens. Dismissal underforum non
conveniens requires more than a showing of the contractual agreement to
litigate elsewhere. The defendant would have the more difficult task of
court should apply state X's law and dismiss the case. B would then file suit against A
in state Y, allowing the court in state Y to apply state Y's law.
Courts facing this type of pleading, however, may characterize the motion to dismiss under the forum selection clause as a motion to transfer under § 1404(a) in
order to stop B from pleading around Stewart.
146. Under the doctrine offorum non conveniens, federal courts may dismiss suits
where the alternate forum is in a foreign country. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 21, at
260. In deciding whether dismissal is proper, the court considers the same factors of
fairness to the litigants, convenience of the witnesses, interest of the forum, and
accessibility of evidence, that federal courts consider in ruling on motions for transfer within the federal system under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Compare Piper Aircraft Co. v.
Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 102 S.Ct. 252 (1981), with Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh
Corp., 108 S.Ct. 2239 (1988).
147. See supra note 21.
148. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965); supra notes 70-72 and accompanying

text.
149. Stewart, 108 S.Ct. at 2248 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also supra note 34.
150. Stewart, 108 S.Ct. at 2243 n.6. See also, Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S.
740, 752-53 (1980).
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showing that other factors lean toward dismissal as well.15 1 The plaintiff, therefore, will likely sue in federal court to avail himself of the law
maximizing his chances for avoiding enforcement of the forum-selection
clause.
Additionally, Walker indicates that applying forum non conveniens in
lieu of state law would result in an inequitable administration of law
because, as discussed above, the "fortuity" of diversity jurisdiction
would affect the outcome of the dismissal motion. 152 Thus, the court
153
would be compelled to apply state law.
3.

The Bremen Governs Enforceability of Forum-Selection Clauses

A federal court may frame the choice-of-law issue as a choice between
applying either state law or the Bremen enforceability rule. Although the
Bremen decision is federal admiralty common law, which does not control
diversity cases,' 54 it can nonetheless apply if the rule is viewed under
Erie as federal procedural common law authorized by Article III and the
Necessary and Proper Clause. The Erie doctrine determines whether it
is so authorized. 15 5
Under the first step of the Erie doctrine, the court determines
whether a federal rule or statute controls. The Bremen rule is judgemade and thus does not apply automatically. The court then looks to
whether application of the federal law would disserve the twin aims of
Erie.' 56 In this case it would.
Application of the Bremen rule would encourage forum shopping.
Plaintiffs bringing actions in states disfavoring forum selection clauses
will sue in state court to avoid a federal court's enforcement of the
clause under The Bremen. Non-resident defendants will then attempt to
remove 15 7 to federal court to invoke the Bremen rule and successfully
move for dismissal. 158 Furthermore, because 28 U.S.C. § 1441 does not
permit resident defendants to remove, application of the Bremen rule
would allow non-resident plaintiffs strategically to choose state law hostile to forum selection clause enforceability while the resident defendant
would be unable to neutralize the plaintiff's maneuver by removing and
invoking the Bremen rule. This is the same type of inequitable administration of law that Erie itself attempted to prevent by overruling Swift v.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

See supra note 146.
See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
See Stewart, 108 S. Ct. at 2243 n.6.
See supra note 9.
See supra note 149.

156. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965); supra notes 70-72 and accompanying

text.
157. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1982) (removal statute). Section 1441(b)
allows only non-resident defendants to remove.
158. Cf Stewart, 108 S.Ct. at 2249 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing the forum
shopping that would follow from application of the Bremen rule;Justice Scalia reached
this issue because he believed § 1404(a) did not control enforceability offorum selection clauses designating U.S. courts).
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Again, applying a federal judge-made rule in this case scenario disserves the twin aims of Erie. The Erie doctrine mandates that federal
diversity courts reject the Bremen rule and apply state law to determine
the enforceability of forum selection clauses designating foreign courts.
The choice-of-law issue raised by forum selection clauses designating foreign courts may be framed by the courts in any of three ways: (1)
a choice between applying and not applying state law (no federal law
governing the issue), (2) a choice between state law and the federal common law doctrine offorum non conveniens, and (3) a choice between state
law and the federal Bremen rule. Regardless of which approach the federal court takes, the Erie doctrine dictates that state law decides the
issue. 160
159. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 74-75; Stewart, 108 S.Ct. at 2249 (Scalia, J., dissenting);
supra notes 25-31 and accompanying text.
Although this type of inequitable administration of law is conceivable, it is unlikely
in the context of forum-selection clauses designating foreign courts because rarely
will a nonresident plaintiff seek to breach a forum-selection clause by suing in his
contractual adversary's home state. Forum-selection clauses designating foreign
courts typically exist in contracts between U.S. citizens and foreign citizens. The foreign citizen will usually compensate the U.S. citizen for agreeing contractually to
limit litigation to a foreign court. It is unlikely that the foreign citizen will then sue in
the U.S. citizen's home state, a place to which the U.S. citizen would probably have
agreed to limit litigation without requiring compensation. Although unlikely, this
scenario may occur if the foreign citizen recognizes a particular advantage in a law of
the U.S. citizen's home state.
Even if such a case never arose, two reasons suggest that the Erie doctrine still
requires application of state law. First, the Supreme Court in Walker v. Armco Steel
Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980), held that an inequitable administration of law occurs
where the "fortuity" of diversity jurisdiction affects the outcome of the case. This
would be the result where the U.S. citizen breaches the clause by suing in a state
court that disfavors forum selection clauses and the foreign citizen removes to federal court to invoke the Bremen rule. Secondly, both parties would be practicing intrastate forum shopping contrary to the goals of the Erie doctrine. See Stewart, 108 S.Ct.
at 2249 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that encouragement of forum shopping is
"alone sufficient to warrant application of state law" and citing Walker, 446 U.S. at
753, for the proposition that failure to meet one part of the twin aims test suffices to
warrant application of state law).
160. Application of the Erie doctrine in this Note has proceeded on the theory that
the second step of the Erie analysis (where no federal rule or statute controls) is an
evaluation of whether applying federal law would disserve the twin aims of Erie: discouragement of forum shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of law.
This appears to be the approach currently preferred by the Supreme Court. See Stewart, 108 S.Ct. at 2243 n.6; see also supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
Lower federal courts have, however, supplemented an evaluation of Erie's twin
aims with Byrd's balancing of the relevant federal and state interests in the application
of each government's respective law. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text. A
federal court using the supplemented version of Erie's second step would balance (1)
the state's interest in advancing its substantive policies through application of its law,
and (2) the need for discouragement of forum shopping and avoidance of inequitable
administration of law, against (3) countervailing federal interests in applying federal
law. The following analysis shows, however, that this approach yields the same result
as the unsupplemented second step of the Erie doctrine.
Federal procedural common law is only legitimate to the extent that it is authorized
by the Article III grant of judicial power and the Necessary and Proper Clause of
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A Federal Common Law Alternative

1. Applying State Law DisfavoringEnforcement: The Negative Effect on U S.
Participationin InternationalCommerce
Forum-selection clauses designating foreign courts typically appear in
contracts between U.S. and foreign citizens.' 6 ' If the U.S. citizen
breaches by suing in a U.S. federal court, the foreign citizen will likely
move for dismissal by demanding enforcement of the clause. The first
part of this Note's analysis showed that the Erie doctrine requires federal
courts to apply state law to the foreign citizen's motion to dismiss under
Article I. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. Therefore, the countervailing
federal interests sufficient to generate federal procedural common law in a Byrd-type
balance must likewise flow from Article III. See supra note 61. These interests are
narrow in scope and procedural in nature and do not include substantive federal
interests. See supra note 90.
The court in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Co., 356 U.S. 525 (1958), specified
three legitimate federal procedural interests, the third of which arguably supports
application of federal law to determine the enforceability of forum selection clauses
designating foreign courts. The federal court system is interested in acting as an
"independent system for administering justice to litigants who properly invoke its
jurisdiction." See supra note 64 and accompanying text. A federal court could find
that, since federal court enforcement of a forum selection clause designating foreign
courts is tantamount to a decision that a litigant has not properly invoked the jurisdiction of the federal court system, federal law must determine enforceability independently of state law in order to avoid compromising the independence of federal
law governing federal court jurisdiction.
Though superficially appealing, this rationale does not stand up to analysis.
Regardless of which law governs forum-selection clause enforceability, a federal
court addressing the issue already has assumed that the litigant has properly invoked
federal court jurisdiction. Federal court jurisdiction is based on federal statutes governing subject matter jurisdiction, see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and on federal constitutional requirements such as personal jurisdiction, see Asahi Metal Industry Co.,
Ltd. v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102 (1987). If the federal court dismisses the case on the basis of the forum selection clause, the court has decided, not
that jurisdiction is lacking, but that the litigant contractually waived his right to sue in
any court other than that designated in the forum selection clause.
The state, on the other hand, has a substantial interest in governing enforcement
of forum selection clauses. State law on enforceability of forum selection clauses is
the vehicle through which the state implements substantive policy decisions. State
law enforcing forum selection clauses reflects the policy of unrestricted freedom to
contract. See, e.g., ABC Mobile Sys. v. Harvey, 701 P.2d 137 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985).
State law disfavoring forum selection clauses reflects the policy that private agreements precluding adjudication in certain courts are not in the public interest. See,
e.g., Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Foster, 382 So.2d 554 (Ala. 1980). But see Stewart
Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 810 F.2d 1066, 1075 (11 th Cir. 1987) (stating that
Alabama's policy disfavoring forum selection clause enforceability is an effort to protect state court jurisdiction and is irrelevant to federal court enforcement of those
clauses). Therefore, even if a court employed Byrd-type balancing, it is unlikely that it
would find federal interests that override the strong state interests in the application
of state law.
161. See, e.g., Sun World Lines, Ltd. v. March Shipping co., 801 F.2d 1066 (8th Cir.
1986) (forum-selection clause designating German courts in a contract between a
U.S. company and a German company).
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the clause. In states disfavoring forum selection clauses,1 62 federal
courts will deny the foreign citizen's motion to dismiss.
Intuitively, the refusal of U.S. courts to enforce forum-selection
clauses designating foreign courts will harm commercial relations with
foreign countries. Foreign companies unable to bargain for enforceable
forum selection clauses with U.S. citizens may decide that the risk of
uncompensated expense and inconvenience associated with litigation in
the U.S. outweighs any benefits derived from U.S. commercial relations.
In the admiralty context, the Supreme Court recognized the potential for this problem in The Bremen, observing that,
For at least two decades we have witnessed an expansion of overseas commercial activities by business enterprises based in the United States. The
barrier of distance that once tended to confine a business concern to a
modest territory no longer does so.... The expansion of American business and industry will hardly be encouraged if, notwithstanding solemn
that all disputes must be
contracts, we insist on a parochial concept
163
resolved under our laws and in our courts.
Although The Bremen is an admiralty decision, its reasoning applies to
international commerce in general.
2. Argument for Creation of FederalCommon Law
The Supreme Court in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino 164 created the
foreign relations enclave of federal common law. 165 The Court held
that the federal common law act-of-state doctrine1 66 controlled the
validity of a
extent to which courts in the United States could pass on16the
7
foreign country's law operating within its own borders.
Concepts of federalism formed an important constitutional underpinning for the creation of the federal common law in Sabbatino.16 8 Sabbatino held that an issue of such national importance as judicial scrutiny
over foreign laws should not be subject to the "divergent and perhaps
parochial" laws of individual states.169 This same notion of federalism
arguably supports the creation of federal common law governing
1 70
enforceability of forum selection clauses designating foreign courts.
162. See supra note 7 (states disfavoring forum selection clauses); Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Foster, 382 So.2d 554 (Ala. 1980) (also disfavoring forum selection
clauses).
163. The Bremnen, 407 U.S. at 7.

164. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
165. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
166. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
167. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423-25.
168. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
169. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 425.
170. Cf Greenberg, supra note 21 (proposing that Sabbatino supports federal common law governing forum non conveniens decisions arising in international cases);
Maier, The Three Facesof Zapata: Maritime Law, Federal Common Law, Federal Courts Lau',
6 VAND.J. INT'L L. 387, 390-97 (1973) (arguing that the Supreme Court in the admiralty case The Bremen intended its forum selection clause enforceability rule to govern
in all international cases, both state and federal, as a matter of federal common law).
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Given the negative effect on international commerce of state law disfavoring forum selection clauses, federal diversity courts could find that
federalism demands creation of this federal common law in order to
protect national interest in robust international commercial relations
7
from the potentially parochial concerns of individual states.' '
To protect U.S. participation in international commerce, the newlycreated federal common law could guarantee that forum-selection
clauses designating foreign courts are prima fade enforceable.1 72 Furthermore, this federal common law would bind both state and federal
courts,' 73 making the breach of forum selection clauses designating foreign courts virtually impossible.
3.

Arguments Against Creation of FederalCommon Law

Although the federalism rationale advanced in Sabbatino supports the
creation of federal common law governing enforcement of forum selection clauses, countervailing policies and concerns unique to this context
counsel decisively against creating such a federal common law rule. The
Sabbatino decision, regarding judicial scrutiny of foreign laws operating
within foreign borders, falls squarely within the realm of foreign affairs
over which the federal government exercises exclusive power. 1 74 "The
framers of the Constitution agreed that the states should have no part in
ordering relations with foreign nations."' 75 The issue of enforcing
forum-selection clauses, however, falls into the realm of contract law,
traditionally governed by the states. 17 6 Moreover, while the enforceability of these clauses may have an impact on foreign relations, it is
limited primarily to foreign commercial relations, rather than foreign political relations, as in Sabbatino.
This distinction tips the federalism balance toward deference to
state law and away from creation of federal common law. Unlike the
realm of foreign political affairs where state interests are virtually nonBut see supra note 9 (non-transferability of admiralty common law to diversity cases).
Professor Maier's assertion that the Bremen Court intended its admiralty rule to bind
state courts is particularly problematic because, since admiralty is within exclusive
federal jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1), the Bremen court had no occasion to consider the federalism implications of displacing state contract law with federal common law.
171. See Maier, supra note 170, at 396. See also Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum
Corp., 384 U.S. 63 (1966) (application of federal common law appropriate where
state law conflicts significantly with a federal policy or interest); Note, The Federal
Common Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1512, 1521 (1969) (endorsing displacement of state
law with federal common law in areas of national interest).
172. This is the rule governing enforceability of forum selection clauses in admiralty set forth in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
173. See Friendly, supra note 93, at 405.
174. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 417-18; Greenberg,
supra note 21, at 174; Note, supra note 171, at 1521.
175. Greenberg, supra note 21, at 174.
176. Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 108 S.Ct. 2239, 2249 (1988)

(Scalia, J., dissenting).
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existent, 1 7 7 regulating contractual arrangements and commercial affairs
between private parties has always been of significant interest to the
78
states.'
Creation of federal common law governing enforceability also raises
concerns about judicial incompetence that the Sabbatino Court did not
face. Federal courts are not equipped to assess accurately the magnitude of potential harm to U.S. participation in international commerce
should state law disfavoring forum selection clauses be applied. Intuitively, this state law would seem to discourage foreign commercial relations with U.S. business, but, given the aforementioned federalism
concerns, the propriety of displacing state with federal law depends on
the degree of discouragement. In determining this degree, courts must
consider myriad complex factors such as the certainty with which foreign
companies assess the likelihood of being amenable to suit in states disfavoring forum-selection clauses' 79 and the extent to which foreign companies believe voluntary compliance with the clauses will obviate the
80
need for judicial enforcement.
Federal courts, with their limited fact-finding capacity, simply cannot adequately examine these and other factors as easily as the Sabbatino
Court could decide that state law should not be permitted to invalidate
the operation of foreign law within foreign borders. Sabbatino follows
readily from the more theoretical and widely-regarded need to allow a
sovereign to act uniformly in ordering relations with foreign
8
governments.' '
If state law disfavoring enforcement of forum selection clauses were
to be displaced by federal law, Congress is the proper lawmaking body.
The legislature is institutionally more competent to assess the factors
determinative of the need for federal law. Also, by virtue of its political
accountability to state citizens, Congress can better examine the federalism implications of displacing state law in an area of traditional state
18 2
interest.
177. Note, supra note 171, at 1521.

178. See supra note 160.
179. A defendant is amenable to suit in a particular state only if the state has personal jurisdiction over him. Personal jurisdiction depends primarily upon the
defendant's contacts with the state. See generally, Asahi Metal, 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
180. Arguably, U.S. companies engaging in foreign trade are large, sophisticated
corporations that would avoid patent breaches of contract in order to preserve their
commercial reputations.
181. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 427 n.25; Note, supra note 171, at 1520.
182. See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois and Michigan, 451 U.S. 304, 312-13 (1981)
("The enactment of a federal rule in an area of national concern, and the decision
whether to displace state law in doing so, is generally made not by the federal judiciary, purposefully insulated from democratic pressures, but by the people through
their elected representatives in Congress"). But see Maier, supra note 170, at 390-97
(arguing that creation of federal common law governing enforceability of forumselection clauses in international cases is a proper exercise of federal judicial power).
The Hague Conference on Private International Law attempted to resolve the
problem of enforceability of forum selection clauses in international contracts in
1964. The Conference drafted and promulgated the "Convention on the Choice of
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IV. Conclusion
In Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., the Supreme Court held that
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) governs motions to transfer based on forum-selection clauses designating courts in the United States. The Court left
open the question of which law federal diversity courts should apply in
ruling on dismissal motions based on forum-selection clauses designating foreign courts. This Note initially determined that the Erie doctrine
directs federal diversity courts to resolve the choice-of-law issue in favor
of state law. After examining the potential harm to U.S. participation in
international commerce of applying state law in this context and a possible federal common law solution to the problem, this Note concluded
that, although Sabbatino supports creation of governing federal common
law, concerns and policies unique to the forum selection clause context
counsel decisively for the rejection of such an expansion of federal common law.
Matthew T. Lampe

Court," attempting to increase international enforcement of forum selection clauses.
See Nadelmann, The Hague Conference on PrivateInternationalLaw and the Validity of Forum
Selection Clauses, 13 AM.J. CoMP. L. 157 (1964). The United States, however, never
adopted the Convention. Leflar, The Bremen and the Model Choice of Forum Act, 6 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 375, 376 (1973).

